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Mandamus As A Means of Federal
Interlocutory Review
Interlocutory orders generally may be defined as orders that do
not decide the merits of an action, but instead decide some non-
dispositive issue or matter. They have also been described as "orders
that merge into the final judgment and that can be effectively re-
viewed on the appeal of a subsequent order ... [or] orders that may
be subject to a later reconsideration and correction by the trial court."'
Traditionally, appeals taken from such orders before entry of a final
judgment in the action have not been favored by the federal courts
since a proliferation of interlocutory appeals would lead to piecemeal
litigation and delay. In most cases, the appeal of issuesr determined by
a district court during the pendency of an action must be reserved
until after final judgment has been rendered, at which time all ap-
pealable issues can be consolidated.
Under some circumstances, however, an interlocutory appeal
may be desirable to protect a valuable right of a party, to expedite
an action, or to avoid the delay and expense of an unnecessary trial.
Prior to 1958, there were only two significant means by which inter-
locutory review could be obtained. The first was what is today section
1292(a) of the Judicial Code, which permits appeals of certain types
of orders specified in the statute, such as orders involving receiver-
ships or injunctions. 2 The other important method was to petition a
court of appeals for a prerogative writ,3 typically the writ of manda-
mus.4  In the Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958,5 Congress added
subsection (b) to section 1292. This provision granted discretionary
authority to the federal courts to entertain interlocutory appeals from
civil orders that involve a "controlling question of law as to which there
is substantial ground for difference of opinion," the resolution of which
1. Comment, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEx. L R-v. 292, 296 (1966).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1970).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970).
4. The common law writ of mandamus
issues from a court of superior jurisdiction, and is directed to a private or municipal
corporation, or any of its officers, or to an executive, administrative or judicial officer,
or to an inferior court, commanding the performance of a particular act therein specified,
and belonging to his or their public, official, or ministerial duty, 6r directing the restora-
tion of the complainant to rights or privileges of which he has been illegally deprived.
BLACK'S LAw DIcoNAY 1113 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
The writ of prohibition, the counterpart of mandamus, is also used. The federal courts
have not been overly concerned with the distinction between the two, see, e.g., Exparte Simons,
247 U.S. 231, 239-40 (1918), and usually petitioners simply request relief "in the nature of"
mandamus or prohibition. For the sake of convenience, mandamus will be used throughout
this Note to refer to both types of prerogative writs.
5. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-919, 72 Stat. 1770, amending 28 U.S.C. § 1292
(1952).
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"may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."6
This discretionary power of review has been used sparingly by the
federal courts7 and thus has not eliminated the authority or the need
for occasional review by mandamus.
This Note will examine the present utility of mandamus as an
independent means of obtaining review of federal district court in-
terlocutory orders.8 Although an occasional criminal case will be
mentioned, the discussion primarily will concern civil actions.9 The
first section will examine the policy behind interlocutory review in
general and the limited availability of this type of review under pres-
ent federal statutes and case law. The role of mandamus in federal
appellate practice will then be considered in relation to that general
policy and use. A principal concern here is the delineation of cir-
cumstances in which mandamus may be used to review an inter-
locutory order when other means are unavailable. To illustrate these
circumstances, three types of interlocutory orders will be discussed
in section III. The conclusion reached in this Note is that although
the appellate courts vary in the extent to which they will permit
mandamus review, this type of review is generally limited to ex-
traordinary cases involving an alleged abuse of discretion or usurpa-
tion of power by a district court.
I. INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW IN THE FEDERAL COURTS:
AN OVERVIEW
A. The Problem
The federal court system has long operated with a policy that
appeals from district court orders generally should not be entertained
during the pendency of an action, but rather should be held in abey-
ance until the district court has disposed of all the issues before it and
has rendered a final judgment.10 This "final judgment rule" origi-
nated in the Judiciary Act of 178911 and is found today in section 1291
of the Judicial Code, which provides: "The courts of appeals shall
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
7. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 518-19 (3d ed. 1976); Redish, The Pragmatic
Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 CoLuN. L. REv. 89, 109 (1975).
8. This Note is concerned only with mandamus review by the federal courts of appeals.
Direct review of district court orders by the Supreme Court may be accomplished pursuant to
the Court's mandamus power under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970). lowever, mandamus review of
district court orders by the federal appellate courts is far more common, See 9 MooR,'S FtD-
ERAL PRACTICE 110.27, at 290-302 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as MoonRES],
9. Mandamus is available in criminal actions as well. See. e.g,.. Note, The Use f
Mandamus to Control Prosecutorial Discretion, 13 Ar,1. CRIM. L. REV. 563 (1976).
10. Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARV. L. Arv, 351, 351-53 (1961).
11. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84 (1789), For a detailed history of the




have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district
courts of the United States . . . except where a direct review, may
be had in the Supreme Court.' 2  The statute does not explicitly
prohibit appeals from interlocutory orders of the district courts and
one might argue that the courts of appeals are not constrained thereby
from creating equitable rules that permit review of such orders.'
3
Nevertheless, section 1291 has been construed to require a final
judgment in a district court action before nondispositive orders may
be appealed.
14
The policy behind the final judgment rule is sound for several
reasons. First, the rule avoids the piecemeal litigation that results
from interlocutory appeals. 5 The reviewing court is able to gain a
better perspective of all the issues presented in the case when they
are consolidated after a final judgment has been rendered. Second,
interlocutory appeals delay the progress of a case toward its disposi-
tion, frustrating judicial economy and burdening the already congested
appellate court dockets.' 6 In many instances, these appeals are un-
necessary because the contested issues may become moot after a final
judgment is rendered. 17  For example, a defendant whose motion for
a change of venue is erroneously denied might nevertheless prevail
on the merits of his case, making the need for an early appeal super-
fluous. Needless additional litigation would have resulted had the
appeal been allowed immediately after denial of the transfer motion.
Third, the unlimited availability of interlocutory review would sub-
ject the orderly process of federal court litigation to dilatory tactics,
which could cause devastating expense to the parties. Particularly,
in complex lawsuits, incessant interlocutory appeals of routine court
orders could unfairly debilitate the parties least able to bear the ex-
pense and delay of seemingly endless litigation.1 Finally, some com-
mentators have maintained that routine interlocutory review would
undermine the authority of the district court judges.19
On the other hand, there are circumstances in which inter-
locutory review may serve to expedite an action rather than delay it.
For example, an immediate appeal of a court order refusing to re-
mand an action to state court might reveal reversible error in the
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
13. See Redish, supra note 7, at 125.
14. Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394 (1976); Will v. United States, 389 U.S.
90 (1967); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 37(1953).
15. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 96 (1967); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland,
346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953).
16. Redish, supra note 7, at 101.
17. Id. at 89. The traditional view was that "[olne was not really aggrieved until the
final judgment." M. GtREN, BAsic CIVIL PROCEDuRE 232 (1972).
18. Redish, supra note 7, at 101, 104-05.
19. Eg., id. at 101.
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federal court's determination of subject matter jurisdiction and thus
save the time and expense of an improper trial. An interlocutory
appeal might also protect a party from the irreparable harm that could
result from compliance with a district court order. For example, if
a district court orders a news reporter to reveal a confidential news
source in a libel or invasion of privacy suit, the reporter may appeal
the order after a final judgment has been entered on the merits. But
the protection of an appeal is worthless to the reporter unless it can
be taken before the information must be revealed.20  The irreparable
harm that can result from the denial of an early appeal is also demon-
strated by actions involving trade secrets. As one commentator
explains it:
Although the court could issue protective orders to guard the secret's
value, the party may rightfully claim that revealing the information
might cause serious competitive harm, and that the opportunity to chal-
lenge the information's discoverability on appeal after a final judgment,
and after compliance with the district court's order, may prove a rather
worthless form of protection.21
Thus, the problem facing the federal courts and Congress has
been to formulate a sensibly flexible policy that permits interlocutory
review when it is in the interest of justice, but avoids the costs and
potential abuse of piecemeal litigation. Toward that goal, Congress
enacted section 1292 of the Judicial Code, 22 which provides for inter-
locutory appeals of specified types of district court orders. In addi-
tion, the federal courts themselves have carved out a few narrowly-
defined exceptions to the final judgment rule. Finally, the appellate
courts have allowed the use of the extraordinary, or prerogative, writ
of mandamus. It is mandamus with which this Note is concerned,
but its significance as a means of obtaining interlocutory appeals
should be viewed in the context of the other exceptions to the final
judgment rule outlined below.
B. Judicially-Created Exceptions to the Final Judgment Rule
Some of the flexibility with which the federal courts have ap-
plied the final judgment rule is attributable to the difficulty in pre-
cisely defining a final judgment. The traditional definition of a final
judgment is "one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves
nothing for the court to do but to execute the judgment." 23 In the
vast majority of cases there is little problem in labelling an order on
20. See, e.g., Gialde v. Time, Inc., 480 F.2d 1295, 1303 (8th Cir. 1973) (Heaney, J.,
dissenting in part).
21. Redish, supra note 7, at 99.
22. See S. REP. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reorinted in [1958] U.S. CoDi
CONG. & AD. NEws 5256.
23. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
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that basis as either final or interlocutory. 24  However, there are in-
stances in which orders are appealable as final judgments even though
they do not end the litigation on the merits. 2 ' For example, a district
court order quashing service of process on all defendants does not
dispose of the merits of the action, but the dismissal is a final judg-
ment from which an appeal may be taken.26
The Supreme Court has yet to formulate a single comprehensive
definition of a final judgment. "The cases, it must be conceded, are
not altogether harmonious."27 The Court in recent years has favored
a pragmatic approach to finality, focusing its inquiry upon the dis-
positive effect of the judgment. Under the banner of this pragmatic
approach the federal courts have created at least four exceptions to
the traditional final judgment rule.
The first exception was created by the Supreme Court in Forgay
v. Conrad.2 8 The Court in that case considered the appealability of a
district (circuit) court order setting aside a conveyance of land to the
defendant and ordering the land's immediate transfer to the plaintiff,
an assignee in bankruptcy. Although the order did not constitute a
final judgment (an accounting of rents and profits was still to be made),
the Court recognized that postponement of an appeal from the order to
transfer the land would cause irreparable harm to the defendant.
The Court ignored the lack of technical finality:
The question upon the motion to dismiss is whether this is a final decree,
within the meaning of the acts of Congress. Undoubtedly, it is not
final, in the strict, technical sense of that term. But this Court has not
heretofore understood the words "final decrees" in this strict and tech-
nical sense, but has given them a more liberal, and, as we think, a more
reasonable construction, and one more consonant to the intention of the
legislature.29
A commentator has said that the Court's opinion in Forgay repre-
sents the "genesis of the 'reasoned elaboration' of appealability
which the Supreme Court has more openly avowed in recent years. 30
24.
The saving grace of the imprecise rule of finality is that in almost all situations it is en-
tirely clear, either from the nature of the order or from a crystallized body of decisions,
that a particular order is or is not finaL No one wopld doubt that a judgment award-
ing money damages to plaintiff on the only claim involved in the case is a final judg-
ment. No one would doubt that an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 12
(b)(6) is interlocutory and not final. The case in which there is real doubt about the
finality of an order is extremely rare, although recent cases broadening the concept of
finality have created uncertainties.
C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 505.
25. See Redish, supra note 7, at 90.
26. Cook v. Bostich, Inc., 328 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1964).
27. McGourkey v. Toledo & Ohio Cent. Ry., 146 U.S. 536, 544-45 (1892).
28. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848).
29. Id. at 203.
30. Note, Statutory Criteria for Review in the Federal Courts: The Proper Indicia for
Appealability?, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 365, 373 (1967).
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To the extent that the opinion indicates the Court's willingness to
consider the practical consequences of a very narrowly-defined species
of interlocutory order, this is true; however, the Forgay doctrine far
from dissolved the final judgment rule. The key to that decision ap-
parently is that the district court's interlocutory order required an
immediate transfer of the property, the subject matter of the action.31
Efforts to use the "irreparable harm" argument alone have not been
very successful outside the fact pattern presented in Forgay.32
The second exception to the final judgment rule is the "collateral
orders" doctrine, 33 derived from the Supreme Court's decision in
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.34 In Cohen, the defendant
in a stockholder's derivative action moved to require the plaintiff to post
security for the defendant's reasonable expenses, including attorney
fees, pursuant to a New Jersey statute. The district court denied the
motion, holding that the state statute did not apply to derivative ac-
tions in federal court. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the
court order was appealable despite its interlocutory nature. The
Court utilized a pragmatic approach to define finality:
This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally de-
termines claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights as-
serted in the action, too important to be denied review and too inde-
pendent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be
deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. The Court has long given
this provision of the statute this practical rather than a technical con-
struction.
35
The Cohen doctrine is limited to appeals meeting the following
requirements: (1) the issues determined in the district court's order
must be collateral to the merits of the action; (2) the court's decision
must be final, not "tentative, informal, or incomplete"; (3) the appeal
must present a "serious and unsettled question" of law; and (4) delay
in the appeal must create a risk of irreparable harm to the petitioner.
3 6
In a later decision, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin," the Supreme Court
appears to have relaxed these four requirements; 38 but it is clear from
31. In Perkins v. Fourniquet, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 206 (1848), the companion case to Forgay,
the Court considered a circuit court order staying the transfer of property until an accounting
could be completed. The Court held that the order was not appealable.
32. Comment, supra note 1, at 299.
33. Professor Redish indicates that the "collateral orders" doctrine was "characteried
as an 'interpretation' of section 1291, rather than an exception to it" in United States v.
Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164, 170 (4th Cir. 1972); however, he believes that since the doctrine
serves to permit interlocutory appeal of an order which does not terminate the litigation, the
doctrine is better viewed as an exception to § 1291. Redish, supra note 7, at Ill n.120,
34. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
35. Id. at 546 (emphasis added).
36. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 508; Redish, supra note 7, at 112.
37. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
38. In Eisen, the Supreme Court relied upon the "collateral orders" doctrine, reiterat-
ing the first two requirements of Cohen set out in the text above. In holding that a district
[Vol. 38:301
the Court's statement in Cohen,39 repeated in Eisen,4° that only a
small class of orders will qualify for appeal under the doctrine.
A third, very narrow exception, has evolved in the area of class
action certifications, arising out of the Second Circuit's decision in
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.4 ' The plaintiff in this case was denied
representative status for a class of shareholders. Because the plain-
tiff's individual claim was too small to warrant litigation, the denial of
representative status meant, as a practical matter, the termination of
the suit. The Second Circuit held that the district court's order was
appealable because its effect was the "death knell" of the action.
42
The Supreme Court denied certiorari.43  Professor Wright has criti-
cized the use of this "death knell" rationale,44 and has indicated
that it has not been received favorably in all circuits.4
Finally, the Supreme Court's decision in Gillespie v. United
States Steel Corp.46 has been labelled the Court's "sharpest depar-
ture from traditional notions of finality.', 7  Plaintiff in Gillespie
brought suit in federal court for claims based on the Jones Act and
on a state wrongful death statute. The district court struck the state
law claim as well as joinder of the decedent's brother and sisters as
co-plaintiffs. The Sixth Circuit classified the order as interlocutory,
yet permitted an immediate appeal on its merits.48 The Supreme
Court affirmed,49 describing the order as one within "the 'twilight zone'
of finality." 50 Applying its previously announced "practical" ap-
proach to the final judgment rule, the Court spoke of balancing "the
inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and
court order imposing the prohibitive cost of notifying members of a class could be appealed
before final judgment, the Court made no mention of the "serious and unsettled question"
requirement of Cohen, although, as commentators have noted, that requirement was certainly
met in Eisen. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 508.
Nor does Tsen mention the fourth requirement of irreparable harm. One commen-
tator believes that cases decided after Cohen indicate that the irreparable harm element is
only incidental to the Cohen rationale. Comment, supra note 1, at 301. However, Pro-
fessor Wright has stated that irreparable harm is still a requirement of the "collateral orders"
doctrine. C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 508. The lower federal courts have not been con-
sistent in reading Cohen and Eisen. Id. at 509-10.
39. 337 U.S. at 546.
40. 417 U.S. at 172.
41. 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
42. Id. at 120-21.
43. 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
44. C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 510.
45. The "death knell" doctrine has been accepted in some circuits and rejected in others.
See id. at 509.
46. 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
47. C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 511.
48. 321 F.2d 518, 522 (6th Cir. 1963), afd, 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
49. 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
50. Id. at 152.
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the danger of denying justice by delay on the other,"51 and concluded
that in Gillespie the latter outweighed the former.
52
The opinion drew sharp criticism for its murkiness from one
commentator53 who nevertheless considers Gillespie the foundation
of a new "balancing approach" by the Court.54 However, neither
the "balancing approach" nor the Gillespie decision itself" has
received much attention from the federal courts.56
In summary, the Supreme Court's pragmatic rather than techni-
cal approach to finality has led to the creation of several exceptions
to the final judgment rule. None of these narrowly-defined exceptions,
however, has had much impact on the arbitrariness of the final judg-
ment rule.
C. Statutory Interlocutory Appeals
By enacting what is presently section 1292(a) of the Judicial
Code,57 Congress designated certain district court orders relating to
injunctions, receiverships, patent infringement actions, and admiralty
actions as worthy of interlocutory appeal. In addition, interlocu-
tory appeals may be taken from certain bankruptcy orders.5 8 In 1958,
Congress added subsection (b) to section 1292, bestowing power
upon the federal courts to hear discretionary interlocutory appeals.
Section 1292(b) states:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not other-
wise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,
he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may
51. Id. at 152-53 (citing Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511
(1950)).
52. 379 U.S. at 153.
53. "The Court's opinion in Gillespie is astounding for it3 clouded reasoning and cnig-
matic conclusions. It is unfortunate that a decision which may represent a truly significant
adjustment of the entire philosophy of appealability is so devo d of any persuasive analysis."
Redish, supra note 7, at 118.
54. Professor Redish advocates the "balancing approach" as an independent exception
to the final judgment rule. Such an exception would take into consideration the "external"
consequences of an interlocutory order, such as
(1) the delay which might result before the case would ultimately be heard on appeal af-
ter a final judgment, (2) the harm this delay would cause to the litigant's financial
or personal situation, and (3) the length and expense of discovery and trial, in relation
to the relative financial capabilities of the parties seeking appeal, that may prove un-
necessary if the district court's order is ultimately reversed.
Redish, supra note 7, at 100.
55. "[F]or the most part Gillespie has either been ignored by the courts of appeals or
invoked to justify appeals that could have been explained on more traditional notions of
finality." C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 511-12.
56. Redish, supra note 7, at 98, 120-21.
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1970).
58. 11 U.S.C. §§ 47, 48 (1970).
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thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such
order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the
order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall
not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the
Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.59
This subsection requires that the appeal meet three requirements:
(1) the district court order must present a "controlling question of
law"; (2) that question must be one upon which there is "substantial
ground for difference of opinion"; and (3) the appeal must be one
that "may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litiga-
tion." Dual certification of these elements by both the district court
and the court of appeals is necessary before the appeal may be
heard.60  Whether either certification is granted is totally within the
discretion of the district and appellate courts.1 If the district court
certifies the appeal, the court of appeals may refuse to consider it
without even stating its reasons for the refusal.62
Although section 1292(b) appears on its face to be a readily avail-
able escape valve from the final judgment rule, the federal courts
generally have construed this section narrowly by insisting upon strict
satisfaction of the three statutory requirements. These three require-
ments "are not to be read so broadly that the district court can allow
appeal whenever it would promote the 'efficient administration of jus-
tice,' since the Judicial Conference draftsmen deliberately rejected
this phraseology in favor of a more restricted wording." 63  Despite
what appears to be a contrary indication from the draftsmen, one
commentator has described section 1292(b) as requiring a "skillful
balancing of many factors by the district judge."' '  But another
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). For more background on § 1292(b), including its legis-
lative history, see Comment, Discretionary Appeals of District Court Interlocutor)' Orders:
A Guided Tour Through Section 1292(b) of the Judicial Code, 69 YALE L.J. 333 (1959).
60. Note, supra note 10, at 379. A district court's certification of an interlocutory appeal
under § 1292(b) should not be confused with certification of an appeal under Rule 54(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 54(b) permits a district court to direct judgment
with regard to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties in an action. An immedi-
ate appeal may then be taken from the judgment.
An order certified for appeal under Rule 54(b) constitutes a final judgment with regard
to those claims or parties severed from the rest of the lawsuit still pending. Thus, while a
§ 1292(b) appeal is a departure from the final judgment rule, a Rule 54(b) appeal is not. Note,
supra note 10, at 381.
61. Redish, supra note 7, at 108.
The rationale of a double discretionary system is that the district court, better able
to gauge both the timesaving from a reversal and the presence of dilatory motives in the
request for appeal, can protect the appellate courts from an inundation of applica-
tions for appeal, while the appellate court, free from the temptations and pressures
which face the district court, can better estimate the likelihood of error and the burden
upon its own docket.
Note, supra note 10, at 379.
62. Redish, supra note 7, at 109.
63. Comment, supra note 59, at 341.
64. Id. at 343.
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commentator, who himself advocates the adoption of a "balancing
approach" to interlocutory appeals in general, believes that section
1292(b) falls far short of that approach. 65  In any event, the district
courts and courts of appeals have not certified many appeals on the
basis of section 1292(b)66 and generally have limited its application
to exceptional cases.67
II. MANDAMUS REVIEW
A. Development of Mandamus Review in the Federal Courts68
Whether a federal court of appeals may entertain an appeal of an
interlocutory order presented by petition for a writ of mandamus is
a question of propriety, not of power.69  The power to issue this and
other extraordinary writs was vested in the federal courts by the
Judiciary Act of 1789,70 and is today codified in section 1651 of the
Judicial Code:
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Con-
gress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respec-
tive jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or
judge of a court which has jurisdiction.7'
On the other hand, the propriety of using mandamus to invoke
appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory order has been the subject
of much disagreement among the circuits, due in part to a history of
inconsistent guidance with regard to mandamus from the Supreme
Court.
Although issuance of the writ is within the discretion of the ap-
pellate courts,72 that discretion generally has been exercised con-
65. Professor Redish believes his "balancing approach," "(b]y painting with a broader
brush, . . allows the court to focus on the unique circumstances of individual eases, to
weigh the likelihood of reversal of an interlocutory order against the burdens the litigants
might face if appeal were rejected." Redish, supra note 7, at 111 (emphasis added).
The burden upon the litigants is generally one of what Professor Redish calls "external
consequences" of the unavailability of immediate appeal. Section 1292(b), he argues, is
solely concerned with "internal consequences." "The economic or personal hardship that
may result from an adverse interlocutory order is irrelevant for section 1292(b) purposes: if
allowing appeal does not increase the chances of an earlier termination of the case, the
statutory exception [to the final judgment rule] offers no relief." Id. at 110.
66. C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 518-19; Redish, supra note 7, at 109.
67. C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 518.
68. A discussion of the origins and development of mandamu3 may be found in Note, supra
note 9, at 564-70.
69. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943).
70. Note, supra note 10, at 375.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970). Other writs authorized by this statute include prohibition,
common law certiorari, injunctions, and habeas corpus. 9 Mool:u's 110.26, supra note 8, at
278-79.
72. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); Experte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943),
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servatively 73 so that the policy against piecemeal litigation is not
frustrated.74 Mandamus traditionally may be used only when no
other means of appeal is available,75 and even then only in "ex-
traordinary causes."' 6 The Supreme Court said in 1943 that the ap-
pellate courts could issue the writ only "to confine an inferior court
to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to
exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so."77 By 1953, the
Court had elaborated on the propriety of mandamus by including a
district court's "usurpation of powerlS or "abuse of discretion"7 9 as
grounds for issuance of the writ. But the opinion in Bankers Life &
Casualty Co. v. Holland0 made it clear that the availability of manda-
mus was still limited to the extraordinary case. In Holland, man-
damus was held to be an inappropriate means of reviewing a district
court's determination of improper venue because, even if the district
court had erred in its holding on the question of venue, no abuse of
discretion or power could be found in the court's order. Commenting
on the consequences that would have resulted had the writ been ap-
proved, Justice Clark wrote:
The office of a writ of mandamus would be enlarged to actually control
the decision of the trial court rather than used in its traditional function
of confining a court to its prescribed jurisdiction. In strictly circum-
scribing piecemeal appeal, Congress must have realized that in the
course of judicial decision some interlocutory orders might be erroneous.
The supplementary review power conferred on the courts by Congress
in the All Writs Act is meant to be used only in the exceptional case
where there is clear abuse of discretion or "usurpation of judicial power."
...This is not such a case.
8
'
In its decisions before 1957 the Supreme Court seemed to be
resolutely opposed to any expansion of the mandamus remedy.'2
Gradually, however, the Court extended the concept of "usurpation
73. C. WiGHT, supra note 7, at 516.
74. Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520 (1956).
75. Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). Mandamus may not be used as a "substitute" for
appeal Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953); Ex parie Fahey, 332 U.S. 258
(1947).
76. Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947).
77. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943). An example of an appellate
court's use of mandamus to compel a district court to exercise its "duty" can be found in Hall v.
West, 335 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1964). In that case, petitioners sought to expedite the district courts
own order, issued four years earlier, calling for desegregation of the local school system. The
Fifth Circuit, by writ of mandamus, ordered the lower court to perform its duty, i.e. to issue a man-
datory injunction ordering the submission of a desegregation plan.
78. Eg., DeBeers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945).
79. Eg., Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953).
80. 346 U.S. 379 (1953).
81. Id. at 383 (citations omitted).
82. See, e.g., Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953); Roche v. Evaporated
Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943); Exparte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
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of power" to encompass improper actions of district courts other than
those relating solely to the wrongful assumption of jurisdiction, as for
example, when mandamus was used successfully to challenge the im-
proper denial of a jury trial in civil actions.13
A significant expansion of mandamus review came in La Buy v.
Howes Leather Co. The district court in La Buy had referred cer-
tain antitrust actions to a master pursuant to Rule 53(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. All parties to the actions unsuc-
cessfully moved to vacate the references. The Seventh Circuit issued
writs of mandamus, vacating the references, and the Supreme Court
affirmed. The Court in La Buy noted that for several years the trial
judges of the Seventh Circuit had made an excessive number of
references to masters. Despite the interlocutoiy nature of the dis-
trict court's order, the Court considered the need for prompt review
of this practice compelling. The references, said the Court, "amounted
to little less than an abdication of the judicial function depriving the
parties of a trial before the court on the basic issues involved in the
litigation." 5 Distinguishing the situation from that in Holland, the
Court found this to be a "clear abuse of discretion. 86  Most signifi-
cant are the closing remarks of the opinion: "We believe that super-
visory control of the District Courts by the Courts of Appeals is
necessary to proper judicial administration in the federal system. The
All Writs Act confers on the Courts of Appeals the discretionary
power to issue writs of mandamus in the exceptional circumstances
existing here." 87
By its allusion to a supervisory power vested in the courts of ap-
peals, the Supreme Court appeared to be creating a novel, special func-
tion of mandamus review. On the other hand, "supervisory control"
may refer to nothing more than the traditional function of the manda-
mus writ confining the district courts to their jurisdiction and correc-
ting their usurpations of power. But commentators have tended to
view La Buy as a genuine expansion of mandamus beyond its tradi-
tional limits.8 8 This "supervisory power" was tested by the Seventh
Circuit two years later in Atlass v. Miner.89 There the district court in
an admiralty case had directed that oral discovery be made pursuant to
83. Eg., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,
359 U.S. 500 (1959).
84. 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
85. Id. at 256.
86. Id. at 257.
87. Id. at 259-60 (emphasis added).
88. Eg., Redish, supra note 7, at 114; Note, supra note 10, at 376; Note, supra note 30, at
369. A very thorough analysis of the "supervisory mandamus" aspect of La Buy can be found in
Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus Under the All Writs Act, 86 HAv. L. REv. 595 (1973).
La Bay was criticized in Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appel'ate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv.
751, 771-78 (1957).
89. 265 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1959), affd, 363 U.S. 641 (1960).
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a local district court rule. The court of appeals issued a writ of manda-
mus vacating the order, holding that the local court rule was in conflict
with the admiralty rules. The appellate court found that the resolution
of the admiralty rule issue would "serve to avoid a conflict in the dis-
trict courts of this circuit." 90 The Supreme Court affirmed,9' but did not
discuss the appellate court's use of "supervisory mandamus."
The Supreme Court may have expanded the scope of mandamus
even further by sanctioning its use for the review of discovery orders in
Schlagenhauf v. Holder.92 The district court in Schlagenhauf ordered
the defendant in a negligence action to submit to nine separate physical
and mental examinations, purportedly under power granted to district
courts by rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 93 The de-
fendant challenged the court's power to order an examination of any
defendant under rule 35. Furthermore, the defendant claimed that his
physical condition was not "in controversy" and that the examination
was not sought "for good cause" as required by rule 35.
The Seventh Circuit assumed jurisdiction over the merits of the
appeal by considering defendant's application for mandamus. But the
court of appeals ultimately denied the writ, holding that the lower court
did have power under rule 35 to order an examination of a defendant. 94
The court of appeals went on to find that defendant's physical condition
was "in controversy," but the court left the issue of "good cause" unde-
cided. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's order, dis-
agreeing on the merits of the appeal. Although the Court upheld the
power of a district court to order examinations made of a defendant, it
nevertheless found the order for examinations to be improper because
the record failed to show that defendant's condition was "in contro-
versy" and that there was "good cause" for the examinations."
In Schlagenhauf, the Court indicated that mandamus review was
an appropriate method by which the court of appeals could consider the
power of the district court under rule 35. Noting that Schlagenhauf was
the first reported federal court case in which a district court had used
rule 35 to order an examination of a defendant, the Court defended
the use of mandamus, stating:
90. Id. at 313.
91. 363 U.S. 641 (1960).
92. 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a), at the time of the Schlagenhauf decision, pro-tided in relevant
part:
In an action in which the mental or physical condition of a party is in controversy, the
court in which the action is pending may order him to submit to a physical or mental
examination by a physician. The order may be made only on motion for good cause
shown ...
379 U.S. at 106 (emphasis added).
94. 321 F. 2d 43 (7th Cir. 1963), vacated, 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
95. 379 U.S. at 118-19.
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TIThe petition was properly before the court on a substantial allegation of
usurpation of power in ordering any examination of a defendant, an issue
offirst impression that called for construction and application of Rule 35
in a new context. The meaning of Rule 35's requirements of "in contro-
versy" and "good cause" also raised issues offirst impression. In our view,
the Court of Appeals should have also, under these special circumstances,
determined the "good cause" issue, so as to avoid piecemeal litigation and
to settle new and important problems.
9 6
It has been suggested that Schlagenhauf builds upon the "supervisory
power" alluded to in La Buy and perhaps provides the basis for an "ad-
visory power" as well in the federal appellate courts.9 7 This concept
of "advisory mandamus" has its roots in the Court's emphasis of the
"'first impression" nature of the issues involved and the need "to settle
new and important problems," at least with respect to construction of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, the Supreme Court later weakened the "supervisory"
and "advisory" rationales of mandamus review in Will v. United
States.98 Will involved a criminal prosecution for tax evasion. The dis-
trict court granted defendant's request for a bill of particulars and or-
dered the government to provide defendant with information about de-
fendant's own allegedly inculpatory statements. Using mandamus, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted the government's request for
interlocutory review and vacated the district court order without opin-
ion. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the mandamus order,
stating that "only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial
'usurpation of power' will justify the invocation of this extraordinary
remedy."99 The Court went on to dilute the "first impression" ration-
ale of advisory mandamus attributed to Schlagenhauf.
[I]t cannot be contended that Schlagenhauf on its facts supports an invo-
cation of mandamus in this case. The Court theie did note that the vari-
ous questions concerning the construction of Rule 35 were new and sub-
stantial, but it rested the existence of mandamus jurisdiction squarely on
the fact that there was real doubt whether the District Court had any
power at all to order a defendant to submit to a physical examination.9
In addition, the Court restricted the supervisory mandamus rationale
of La Buy to instances in which a district judge displayed a persistent
disregard of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 1
The Will decision has been viewed by some as a general retraction
96. Id. at 111 (emphasis added).
97. Note, supra note 88, at 613-19.
98. 389 U.S. 90 (1967).
99. Id. at 95.
100. Id. at 104-05 n. 14.
101. Id. at 96, 104 n. 14.
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of the La Buy and Schlagenhauf "expansions" of mandamus review.0
The Supreme Court, however, has not yet asserted a clearly definitive
formulation of mandamus review of interlocutory orders.10 3  The
vagueness of the traditional "abuse of discretion" and "usurpation of
power" tests has left considerable freedom for the Court to mold man-
damus relief to suit the needs of the federal court system. At one
extreme, La Buy and Schlagenhauf appear to authorize broad super-
visory and advisory powers in the appellate courts to curb district court
excesses and to guide the district courts in the resolution of "novel"
questions. At the other extreme, Will re-emphasizes the extraordinary
nature of mandamus and reverts its use to its traditional function of
remedying the improper assumption of jurisdiction by the inferior
courts. As these cases indicate, the Court's approach has been an incre-
mental one that has defined the parameters of mandamus review by
rare example. Even the most recent decisions of the Court fail to resolve
much of the controversy °4  Thus, to a large extent the courts of
appeals have been free to utilize mandamus review within reasonable
limits.
B. Mandamus and Section 1292(b) Compared
Before the enactment of section 1292(b) in 1958, mandamus was
regarded as a principal means of tempering the arbitrariness of the
final judgment rule on the theory that the extraordinary writ was ap-
propriate because in most cases no other remedy existed.10 5 When
Congress enacted section 1292(b), placing discretionary authority in
the appellate courts to hear interlocutory appeals, the need for man-
damus was generally expected to be greatly reduced. 1°6 Indeed, since
mandamus is unavailable when a section 1292(b) interlocutory appeal
-or any other remedy-is appropriate, 0 7 a party seeking to obtain
mandamus is well advised to first attempt certification of the appeal
under that statute. 08 If the district court refuses to certify the ap-
102. Eg. Redish, supra note 7, at 115. But see C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 517; Note,
supra note 88, at 621-22.
103. See, e.g., 4 MooRE's 26.83 [9.-3], supra note 8, at 626.
104. Compare Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976) (mandamus
held appropriate to remedy case improperly remanded to state court) with Kerr v. United States
District Court, 426 U.S. 394 (1976) (mandamus not appropriate to vacate order requiring dis-
covery of allegedly privileged documents). Both the Thermatron Products and Kerr cases are
discussed in section III of this Note, infra.
105. See, e.g., 6 J. MooRE, FEDnRAL PRACrICE 1 54.10(1] (2d. ed. 1953); Note, Federal
Review by Extraordinary Writ: A Clogged Safety Valve in the Final Judgment Rule, 63 YALE L
J. 105 (1953); Note, The Writ of Mandamus: A Possible Anaer to the Final Judgment Rule,
50 CoLUm L. Rv. 1102 (1950).
106. C. WRGHT, supra note 7, at 517; Note, supra note 10, at 378.
107. See Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n., 319 U.S. 21 (1943); Mohasco Indus., Inc. v.
Lydick, 459 F. 2d 959 (9th Cir. 1972).
108. See Watkins v. Watlins, 260 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1958).
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peal, of course, the court of appeals will not have the opportunity
to consider the appeal under section 1292(b). At that point the
appellate court may be petitioned to acquire jurisdiction over the
interlocutory appeal by its power to consider the mandamus writ.
If the district court does certify the appeal under section 1292(b),
appellants are wise to petition the court of appeals for the section
1292(b) appeal and in the alternative for mandamus.
The writ continues to be appropriate if "the case is of that rare
sort that would have been appropriate for review by mandamus or
prohibition prior to 1958. ' '19 In other words, the vitality of manda-
mus relief has not been abrogated by the addition of section 1292(b),
in part because the standards for determining the propriety of the two
remedies are different. Section 1292(b) permits the appeal only
when it involves a "controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion," the immediate consider-
ation of which "may materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation." These statutory elements are not specific require-
ments for the issuance of mandamus. For example, the "expediting"
aspect of an appeal required by section 1292(b) is not crucial to
mandamus review, although the possibility of advancing the litiga-
tion may weigh in favor of permitting the writ.
Mandamus is based on notions of "usurpation of power" and
"abuse of discretion."11  It has been suggested that mandamus will
not reach "mere errors of law"1 ' since these are appealable either as
final judgments or under section 1292(b). Thus, a petition for man-
damus "subjects the appellate court to the rigid peremptory standard
of 'abuse of discretion' in contrast to the broader review by appeal
where [the court's] function is to determine whether the District
Court's decision is right on its intrinsic merits." 12  But the dis-
tinction between a mere error of law and an abuse of discretion is
not always a clear one. For instance, in Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion in La Buy the excessive practice of referring cases to mas-
ters was described as at most mere error on a matter within the
judge's jurisdiction, thereby making mandamus inappropriate. 113
The majority of the Court, however, viewed the district court's prac-
109. C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 517.
110. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967); Bankers Life & Cas. Co, v. Holland,
346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953).
111. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382-83 (1953). The Court held
mandamus to be inappropriate in Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520 (1956), holding in that
case that "the most that could be claimed is that the district courts have erred in ruling on matters
within their jurisdiction."
112. Auerbach v. United States, 347 F.2d 742, 743-44 n.2 (5th Cir. 1965) (Brown, J., dis-
senting).
113. 352 U.S. at 261 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tice as both an abuse of discretion 14 and an abuse of power.n5
One writer has concluded that "t]he rather tenuous distinc-
tion between 'mere' error and 'abuse of discretion' provides the ap-
pellate courts with the opportunity to exercise their extraordinary
power whenever they consider immediate review appropriate."' 6
There appears to be some truth in this. Consider two Ninth Circuit
decisions, Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States Dis-
trict Court'1 7 and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States District
Court,1 both involving class actions on behalf of airline crash vic-
tims. In the Pan American case, the district court decided to notify
all potential plaintiffs that actions arising from the crash were pend-
ing before it. After the district court denied certification of a section
1292(b) appeal, the defendants successfully petitioned the court of
appeals for mandamus. The Ninth Circuit reversed the notification
order, holding that the district court had acted without apparent au-
thority vested in it by statute or rule. On the propriety of mandamus,
the court of appeals stated:
While the distinction between error subject to adequate review on appeal
and "usurpation of power" sufficient for mandamus may not always be
clear . . . . the order in this case falls within the latter category.
Notice from the court to potential plaintiffs not authorized explicitly by
statute or rule is so extraordinary that review of such actions by manda-
mus will not frustrate the congressional policy permitting appeals only
from final judgments." 9
Pan American demonstrates the facility with which an appellate court
can find an abuse of discretion in an "extraordinary case" in order
to invoke mandamus review. The Ninth Circuit also granted manda-
mus in the McDonnell Douglas case based on an almost bare con-
clusion that the district court's certification of the suit as a class ac-
tion was an abuse of discretion.120
It is virtually impossible to summarize the circumstances in which
the various federal courts of appeals have permitted mandamus re-
view of interlocutory orders. The body of federal case law on the
subject is replete with variations from circuit to circuit. In the next
section, three categories of typical interlocutory orders-change of
venue orders, remand orders, and discovery orders-are examined to
illustrate the circumstances under which review by mandamus has
been permitted. In each of these categories the Supreme Court has
commented upon the propriety of mandamus review.
114. Id. at 257.
115. Id. at 256.
116. Note, supra note 10, at 377.
117. 523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1975).
118. 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
119. 523 F.2d at 1076 (emphasis added).
120. 523 F.2d at 1087.
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III. REPRESENTATIVE USES OF MANDAMUS REVIEW
A. Change of Venue Orders
The choice of a forum may have an important effect on the pros-
pects for success in an action. Especially when the adverse parties are
states apart, the district court's ruling on a defendant's motion for a
change of venue may be crucial to the effective prosecution or de-
fense of the case. The party that loses on the motion will have to bear
the inconvenience and expense of litigating the action in a distant
forum. That inconvenience and expense can be disastrous in com-
plex lawsuits because the trial in another district may necessitate
transportation of numerous witnesses, records, and exhibits as well as
the parties themselves. When a change of venue is granted and the
plaintiff is the party who must travel, the costs and inconvenience may
be so prohibitive in relation to the amount of damages sought that
the transfer itself may be the "death knell" of the action. Thus, the
losing party to a transfer order will often desire an immediate appeal
from the order.
The statute authorizing changes of venue in the federal court sys-
tem is section 1404 of the Judicial Code, subsection (a) of which
provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the in-
terest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought."' 21 The
statute combines in a motion for change of venue both issues of law
and matters within the discretion of the district court. The issues of
law presented include the determination of proper venue required in
both the transferor and transferee courts. If venue does not exist
in the transferor court, then section 1404(a) is not the proper statu-
tory ground for transfer of the action. 22 Furthermore, the transferee
court must be one in which the action "might have been brought"
originally. 23  Error in the transferor court's determination of those
questions is appealable immediately under section 1292(b) if both
the transferor district court and its court of appeals certify the appeal
under the requirements of that section. 2
4
Even if the district court makes a correct determination that
transfer of the action would be proper under section 1404(a), the
decision to transfer is one within the sound discretion of the trans-
feror court.125  This discretion, however, is not unrestrained. Sec-
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970).
122. Section 1404(a) presupposes that venue is technically correct in both the tranferor
and transferee forums. See 1 MOORE'S 0.145[3], supra note 8, at 1584.
123. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964); Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 US. 335 (1960),
124. Eg., Continental Grain Co. v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 268 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1959);
Orzulak v. Federal Commerce & Nay. Co., 168 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
125. Eg., New York, C & St. L. R. Co. v. Vardaman, 181 F.2d 769 (8th Cir. 1950); LeClair
v. Shell Oil Co., 183 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Ill. 1960).
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tion 1404(a) itself provides that transfer of the case must be both "for
the convenience of parties and witnesses" and "in the interest of
justice." In addition, the federal courts have elaborated upon the
exercise of sound discretion, noting, for instance, that the plaintiffs
choice of forum is entitled to "paramount consideration '12 6 or at least
"6substantial weight" 127 in deciding whether transfer would be "in
the interest of justice." As one court has explained it:
Unless the balance of convenience strongly favors the defendant, the
plaintiffs choice of forum will not be disturbed. Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). . . .The movant must make a clear-cut show-
ing that, on balance, the interest of justice would be better served and
the trial would more conveniently proceed in the other judicial dis-
trict ....
Moreover, a showing of inconvenience to the defendant is not enough
to justify § 1404(a) relief, where transfer would merely place the in-
convenience on the plaintiff.128
When the sole objection to the transferor court's order granting
or denying transfer rests upon an allegation of abuse of discretion, as
opposed to an error of law in determining the existence of venue, an
interlocutory appeal under section 1292(b) is generally not per-
mitted.129  Whether mandamus may provide the means for an imme-
diate appeal has not been clearly decided by the Supreme Court,
although the Court has had several opportunities to provide an
answer. In Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland,130 the Court held
that mandamus was not available to correct an order based on sec-
tion 1406(a), rather than section 1404(a), of the Judicial Code. Sec-
tion 1406(a), applicable in cases in which venue is improper in the
original forum, provides: "The district court of a district in which is
filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dis-
miss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any
district or division in which it could have been brought."13' Whether
venue exists in a district is a question of law, an erroneous de-
termination of which might give rise to an appeal under section
1292(b).132 The only apparent exercise of discretion vested in the
126. Dow Chemical Co. v. Monsanto Co., 256 F. Supp. 315, 316 (S.D. Ohio 1966).
127. Hayes v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 374 F. Supp. 1068 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
128. Toti v. Plymouth Bus Co., 281 F. Supp. 897, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Cf. Nicol v.
Koscinski, 188 F.2d 537, 537 (6th Cir. 1951) ("plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be dis-
turbed").
129. Eg., Standard v. Stoll Packing Corp., 315 F.2d 626 (3d Cir. 1964).
130. 346 U.S. 379 (1953).
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1970).
132. Eg., in Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962), the original district court held
that venue was improper and transferred the action to a proper venue. The transferee court then
held that the transfer was improper because the transferor court had not obtained personal juris-
diction over some of the defendants. As to those defendants, the transferee court dismissed.
The court of appeals, upon an appeal permitted under § 1292(b), affirmed the dismissal. The Su-
preme Court, however, reversed on the merits of the appeal, holding that the transferor court's
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district court by section 1406(a) is the choice of dismissing the ac-
tion or transferring it if "in the interest of justice." The district court
in Holland determined that venue was not properly laid in that forum
and therefore ordered the action transferred. The Fifth Circuit dis-
missed a mandamus petition challenging the order, and the Supreme
Court affirmed. Mandamus was inappropriate, the Court held, be-
cause no usurpation of power or abuse of discretion was discernible
in the district court's actions. 133 At most, the determination of im-
proper venue was "mere error" which mandamus could not rem-
edy. 134  Since Holland appears to be limited to the review of questions
of law involved in the application of section 1406(a), the decision
does not explicitly preclude review by mandamus of abuses of dis-
cretion under section 1404(a). In at least three subsequent decisions
involving attempts to challenge transfer orders by mandamus, the
Supreme Court has rejected opportunities to comment upon the
mandamus remedy.1
35
In the absence of a clear directive from the Supreme Court, the
appellate courts have taken a conservative view toward the use of
mandamus to review transfer orders. Generally, the appellate courts
will not permit mandamus review of district court discretion unless a
clear abuse of that discretion is shown. 136  For example, in A. Olinick
& Sons v. Dempster Brothers, Inc.137 the Second Circuit reviewed an
order transferring a case pursuant to section 1404(a) and held that
mandamus would not be issued since the district court had properly
considered the convenience of the parties and witnesses in concluding
that transfer would be in the interests of justice. But the Seventh
Circuit found an abuse of discretion in Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
Railroad Co. v. Igoe, 1 8 a case in which the district court had refused
to transfer the action. Upon considering the relative convenience of
transfer to the parties and witnesses, the appellate court issued the
mandamus writ after concluding that it was in the interest of justice
to grant defendant's requested change of venue. It appears there-
fore that section 1292(b) provides a means for reviewing transfer
orders in cases in which the existence of venue in either the transferor
lack of personal jurisdiction over some of the defendants did not invalidate the transfer. An appeal
under § 1292(b), of course, was not possible in Holland since the statute was not enacted until 1958.
133. 346 U.S. at 382-83.
134. But see C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. Barnes, 194 F.2d 410 (7th Cir.), aq'd, 344 U.S.
861 (1952), in which mandamus was permitted to review a district court order determining that
venue was proper, and that no dismissal or transfer would lie under s~ction 1406(a).
135. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964); Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960);
Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955).
136. See, e.g., Lemon v. Druffel, 253 F.2d 680 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 821 (1958);
Ex parte Chas. Pfizer & Co., 225 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1955); All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli, 196
F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1952).
137. 365 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1966); accord, Nicol v. Koscinski, 188 F.2d 537 (6th Cir. 1951).
138. 220 F.2d 299 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 822 (1955).
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or transferee forum is disputable. When venue exists, however, and
the only contestable question is the relative convenience of a change of
venue to all parties and witnesses, mandamus may be the only means
of reviewing the district court's discretion.
B. Remand Orders
Just as parties may maneuver to obtain the most favorable venue
in a federal court action, they may similarly be concerned with
whether the action will be maintained in a federal or a state court.
The importance of the court system in which the action is to be tried
has lessened somewhat since the Supreme Court in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins139 declared the applicable substantive law in a diversity
action to be that of the state in which the federal court sits. Never-
theless, parties may still have valid reasons for preferring either state
or federal court to the other, for reason of such differences as rules of
pleading and procedure, rules of evidence, the number of jurors re-
quired to reach a verdict, supervision of discovery, and congestion of
court dockets.140 Furthermore, an action removed to federal court may
be transferred by an order granting a change of venue as earlier dis-
cussed. Thus, the disenchanted party to an order shifting an action
to state or federal court may wish to have an immediate appeal to
save unnecessary time and expense in what could be an improper
forum.
Removal of an action from state to federal court is authorized by
several federal statutes, the most commonly used being section 1441
of the Judicial Code. 14 ' The central requirement of section 1441 is
that the federal court have original jurisdiction of the action sought
to be removed. An action so removed may be challenged by a mo-
tion to remand the case to state court, pursuant to section 1447(c)
which provides:
If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was
removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall
remand the case, and may order the payment of just costs. A certified
copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by its clerk to the clerk of the
State court. The State court may thereupon proceed with such case.1 42
This section clearly mandates the remand of any action removed
"improvidently and without jurisdiction." It thus poses a question of
law concerning federal subject matter jurisdictiol and leaves no
room for the exercise of any discretion.
No appeal will ordinarily be allowed from a district court order
139. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
140. See 7B Moo's [89-13], supra note 8, at JC-686-87.
141. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1970) (emphasis added).
1977]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
remanding or refusing to remand an action since such an order is
interlocutory, not final.1 43  Moreover, the review of an order remand-
ing a case to state court is specifically forbidden by section 1447(d):
An order remanding a case to the State from which it was removed
is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remand-
ing a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to sec-
tion 1443 of this title [civil rights cases] shall be reviewable by appeal
or otherwise. 1"
This provision has been held to prohibit the use of section 1292(b) to
obtain an interlocutory appeal of a remand order.145  The statute
says nothing, however, about orders denying remand of an action
and apparently section 1292(b) discretionary appeals are available to
review these.
146
The Supreme Court has held in several cases that, as a general
rule, mandamus will not lie to vacate a district court order denying
remand.147  The probable reason for this is that an improper re-
fusal to remand typically results from a district court's incorrect
determination that it has federal jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action. Such an incorrect determination constitutes an error of
law, not an abuse of discretion, and therefore mandamus would not
be an appropriate remedy. However, since the traditional function of
the writ has been "to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise
of its prescribed jurisdiction," 48 it would seem that an order im-
properly denying remand should be subject to review by mandamus.
As previously indicated, an order granting remand of a case is
"not reviewable, on appeal or otherwise," according to section
1447(d). The "or otherwise" language ostensibly includes review by
mandamus. Yet the Supreme Court recently allowed mandamus
review of a remand order in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermans-
dorfer.149  In Thermtron Products, plaintiffs, citizens of Kentucky,
brought a personal injury action in a Kentucky state court against
defendants, citizens of Indiana. The defendants removed the action
to a federal district court in Kentucky, alleging diversity of citizenship
as the basis for federal jurisdiction. The federal court then, sua
143. 7B MOORE'S, supra note 8, at JC-728.1-729.
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1970) (emphasis added).
145. In re Bear River Drainage Dist., 267 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1959). The district court in
Bear River remanded to state court an action to adjudicate water rights. The United States,
which had removed the action originally, sought an interlocutory appeal of the remand order. The
Tenth Circuit held that the remand, whether erroneous at law or not, left the appellate court with-
out jurisdiction over the action. The court of appeals stated that by enacting § 1292(b), Congre.s
did not intend to abandon its policy expressed in § 1447(d).
146. 7B MOORE'S, supra note 8, at JC-438; Comment, supra note 59, at 351.
147. lEg., Ex parte Park Square Auto. Station, 244 U.S. 4)2 (1917). But see lit re Winn,
213 U.S. 458 (1909).
148. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
149. 423 U.S. 336 (1976).
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sponte, remanded the case back to the state court. In a short opinion,
the district court cited its crowded docket as the reason for remand.
Although conceding that it had federal subject matter jurisdiction
over the claim, the lower court held that the defendants' "right" to
remove the case under section 1441 had to be "balanced against
plaintiffs' right to a forum of their choice and their right to a speedy
decision on the merits of their cause of action." 5° Defendants then
filed an alternative petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition in
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The writ was denied, partly be-
cause of the prohibition against review of a remand order "on appeal
or otherwise" contained in section 1447(d)."'
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and approved
the use of mandamus to correct the remand of an action not based on
the grounds authorized by section 1447(c), notwithstanding subsection
(d). Justice White's opinion for the Court recites the litany of prior
mandamus decisions of the Court, but fails to pinpoint any clear
precedent for the review of a remand order. Instead, the opinion
rests the propriety of mandamus upon the cursory observation that
no precedent seemed to forbid such review. 5 2 The unstated basis
for allowing mandamus appeared to be what the Court perceived as
an abuse of discretion or usurpation of power by the lower court in
remanding an action on grounds not authorized by statute. No dis-
cretion is given the district courts by section 1447(c) and therefore any
exercise of discretion by a court in remanding an action not removed
"improvidently and without jurisdiction" might arguably constitute
an abuse of discretion.15 ' The "usurpation of power" theory makes
some sense as well because the district court acted in a manner not
authorized by statute.
The more interesting facet of Thermtron Products is its circum-
vention of section 1447(d). The dissenting opinion took the position
that the language of subsection (d) prohibiting review "on appeal or
otherwise" "means what it says."154 The majority construed sub-
section (d) to apply to remand orders issued pursuant to subsection
(c). Thus, the Court indicated, if the trial judge had purported to
remand the action on the grounds that it was removed "improvidently
and without jurisdiction," whether erroneous or not, the order could
not have been reviewed by appeal, by mandamus, or otherwise.155
In other words, the mere invocation of the statutory grounds by a
150. mL at 340.
151. Id. at 341-42.
152. Id. at 353.
153. The Court noted that "[lower federal courts have uniformly held that cases properly
removed. . . may not be remanded for discretionary reasons not authorized by the controlling
statute." 423 U.S. at 345 n.9.
154. Id. at 354 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 343.
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district court would make the improper remand of a case unas-
sailable even by mandamus. One might argue that the improper
remand of a case for unauthorized reasons is no more in derogation
of a defendant's right to remove under section 1441 than is remand
purportedly based on statutory grounds but nevertheless erroneous at
law. But the majority in Thermtron Products apparently disagreed
with that notion. Its concern was that a persistent policy by a district
court of remanding actions 156 because of a crowded docket, or for any
other reason not authorized by section 1447(c), would flagrantly con-
travene the rights of defendants in that district to remove their cases
to federal court pursuant to section 1441. The prevention of a dis-
trict court's abuse of power under section 1447(c) therefore justified
the use of the extraordinary writ.
C. Discovery Orders
The review of discovery orders is a broad subject about which
generalization is difficult since numerous varieties of orders incorporat-
ing matters of both law and discretion might be included under the
category of "discovery." Appeals from discovery orders are inter-
locutory and thus are not appealable as final judgments under section
1291.157 However, refusal by a party to comply with, for example, an
order compelling the production of documents may result in the dis-
missal of the action or other adverse final judgment, which would
then be appealable.1 58  Of course, deliberate noncompliance in order
to obtain an adverse final judgment is a harsh price to pay for an im-
mediate appeal of the order.
The general federal court prohibition of interlocutory appeals of
discovery orders is essential to prevent the use of spurious appeals as
dilatory tactics. The Second Circuit has stated that "[i]n a large and
complicated lawsuit or series of lawsuits closely related, interlocutory
review of such housekeeping matters as discovery would practically
preclude termination of the litigation by settlement or trial within the
normal lifespan of any of the parties, attorneys, or judges." 15 9 In
some cases, however, unnecessary litigation might be avoided if an
early appeal could be obtained. Irreparable harm to a party ordered
to produce sensitive documents or to reveal trade secrets may also
justify interlocutory review. Under these circumstances, an appeal
based on section 1292(b) may be permitted if the action involves
one of the rare discovery orders meeting the three requirements of
156. The record showed that respondent district court judge had apparently remanded
other cases to state court in similar manner. Id. at 341 n.4.
157. Comment, supra note 59, at 356.
158. Id.




that section. For example, an interlocutory order directing a news-
man to identify his news sources in a libel action was reviewed and
affirmed upon an appeal certified under section 1292(b) in Carey v.
Hume.160  Other representative types of discovery orders that have
been appealed under section 1292(b) include those relating to the dis-
closure of grand jury testimony in a civil antitrust action,16 1 the
production of documents,16 2  written interrogatories, 163 and the at-
torney-client privilege.1 64  But most interlocutory discovery orders
will not fall within the scope of section 1292(b) and the federal courts
have preciously guarded against the excessive use of that section so
that the policy against piecemeal litigation would not be under-
mined.16
5
Before Schlagenhauf v. Holder' 66 was decided by the Supreme
Court in 1964, efforts to use mandamus to procure an interlocutory
appeal of a discovery order generally failed,6 7 although in a few cir-
cuits decisions can be found in which the writ was issued .16  For
example, in Hartley Pen Co. v. United States District Court,169 a case
involving a breach of warranty claim by Hartley Pen against a pro-
ducer of ink dye, the defendant used interrogatories to seek disclosure
of Hartley Pen's secret formula for its ink. The district court ordered
disclosure of the formula, even though Hartley Pen possessed the
formula by virtue of an agreement with Formulabs not to disclose its
contents. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted an
immediate appeal upon petition for mandamus. To the defendant's
160. 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 938 (1974).
161. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. City of Fort Pierce, 323 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1963) (control-
ling question of law was whether district court could order disclosure of grand jury testimony to
refresh witnesses" memories).
162. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Assn, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963) (whether
attorney-client privilege applied to corporation to bar discovery of documents in civil antitrust
action).
163. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1964)
(whether plaintiff public utilities could be required to disclose whether they passed on to con-
sumers alleged overcharges in purchases of equipment from defendants).
164. Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanos, 487 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1973)
(whether upon termination of previous litigation the work product prepared incident thereto
loses its qualified immunity); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970) (whether
privilege could be asserted by corporation against shareholders in security-law violations action)
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
165. 4 Moom's 126.83 [9.2], supra note 8, at 612.
166. 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
167. See e.g., Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Civil Center Theatre, Inc., 333 F.2d
358 (10th Cir. 1964) (order requiring production of documents); Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Kirk-
patrick, 203 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1953); Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States, 163 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1947)
(order requiring production of documents); National Bondholders Corp. v. McClintic, 99 F.2d 595
(4th Cir. 1938) (order staying taking of depositions).
168. Eg., Atlass v. Miner, 265 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1959) (order requiring oral deposition in
admiralty proceeding), affd., 363 U.S. 641 (1960); United States v. United States District Court,
238 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1956) (order in criminal antitrust proceeding issuing subpoenas duces
tecum), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 981 (1957).
169. 287 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1961).
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contention that an appeal could properly be taken only from a final
judgment, the court replied:
This argument is predicated on the premise that if [defendant]
should prevail in the main action and a final judgment be entered by
the district court in its favor, the petitioner would have the right to
appeal from such final judgment to this Court. If this Court should
find the orders complained of clearly erroneous, this Court would re-
verse the judgment. The premise presupposes a disclosure by petitioner
of the trade secrets in compliance with the order of disclosure. Such a
victory by petitioner on such appeal would indeed be a Pyrrhic one.
Petitioner would have won a battle, but petitioner and Formulabs would
have lost the trade secret.'
In Schlagenhauf, the Supreme Court permitted mandamus re-
view of an alleged usurpation of power by a district court which had
ordered the taking of physical and mental examinations of a de-
fendant. The interpretation of rule 35 presented a case of first
impression, which the Court regarded as a significant justification for
issuing the writ. However, in Will v. United States,171 the Court
discounted the significance of the "first impression" aspect of
Schlagenhauf, and recanted somewhat its approval of an advisory
mandamus rationale. 172  The combined impact of Schlagenhauf and
Will has been to create a difference of opinion among the circuits
concerning the yalidity of the "first impression" approach.
The Third Circuit rejected a "first impression" argument in Beal
v. Schu'73 and denied mandamus to petitioners who relied upon
Schlagenhauf. The Second Circuit also rejected an attempt to in-
voke Schlagenhauf in American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Trans-
america Insurance Co.174 over the dissent of one judge who noted
that the court had an opportunity to resolve the conflicting decisions
of the district courts in that circuit. But the "first impression"
rationale recently provided the basis for the use of mandamus in
Colonial Times, Inc. v. Gasch.
175
The petitioner in Gasch brought suit to enjoin the United States
Postal Service from interfering with the mailing of an underground
newspaper. The district court would not authorize the petitioner's
attempts to take depositions of Postal Service employees by tape
recording rather than by conventional stenographic means, so man-
damus was sought in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
The writ was granted after the appellate court determined that the
issue before the court involved "an important aspect of discovery
170. Id. at 328-29.
171. 389 U.S. 90 (1967).
172. See text accompanying notes 100-102 supra.
173. 383 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1967).
174. 380 R2d 277 (2d Cir. 1967).
175. 509 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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law" 176 and, citing Schlagenhauf, that mandamus could resolve an
issue of first impression concerning the construction of rule 30(b)
(4).177 Thus, despite the Supreme Court's decision in Will, Schlagen-
hauf has apparently expanded, to some extent, mandamus review of
discovery orders.
178
The Court has recently emphasized that mandamus should be
reserved for the extraordinary case, however, and that it should be
restricted to usurpations of power and abuses of discretion by the lower
courts. The plaintiffs in Kerr v. United States District Court'
79
brought a class action on behalf of all California state prisoners. Seek-
ing injunctive and declaratory relief, plaintiffs alleged constitutional
violations in the manner in which the California Adult Authority deter-
mined the length of detention for convicted offenders. Plaintiffs
sought to compel the production of various documents, including
personnel files of the parole authority and random prisoner files.
The parole authority claimed that all of the files were irrelevant,
confidential, and privileged. It requested that the district court
conduct an in camera inspection of all files produced for plaintiffs.
The district court ordered the files produced without provision for
an in camera inspection, but it did issue a protective order limiting
the number of people associated with plaintiffs' counsel who could
view the files. The parole authority petitioned for mandamus, which
the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court affirmed unani-
mously with one justice not participating.
The Court found that the opinion of the court of appeals did not
foreclose all possibility that the files could be inspected in camera
before disclosure to plaintiffs. The writ had been denied because the
parole authority had not asserted its claimed governmental privilege
with requisite specificity. In other words, petitioners had available
to them "an avenue far short of mandamus to achieve precisely the
relief they seek."'80 In reasserting that mandamus should be denied
when other adequate remedies exist, the Kerr decision may be another
signal of the Court's concern that mandamus review, at least of dis-
covery orders, be reserved for the extraordinary case.
176. Id. at 525.
177. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4).
178. Eg., Heathman v. United States District Court, 503 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1974) (order
for production of documents); United States Board of Parole v. Merhige, 487 F.2d 25 (4th Cir.
1973) (order authorizing deposition), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); International Business
Machines Corp. v. United States, 471 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1972) (order requiring production of
documents), overturned en banc on other grounds, 480 F.2d 293 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
980 (1974); Investment Properties Int'l Ltd. v. IOS, Ltd., 459 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1972) (order dis-
allowing deposition); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1972) (attorney-client privilege);
In re United States, 348 F.2d 624 (Ist Cir. 1965) (order permitting depositions).
179. 426 U.S. 394 (1976).
180. Id. at 405.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The importance of mandamus to the litigants in an action is two-
fold. First, mandamus may be sought directly from the court of ap-
peals, whereas any appeal under section 1292(b) is dependent upon
obtaining the requisite certification from the district court. Second,
mandamus may be appropriate to review certain types of orders not
appealable under section 1292(b). Section 1292(b) provides ex-
clusively for appeals of questions of law. Mandamus, on the other
hand, is designed principally to rectify a district court's usurpation of
power or abuse of discretion.
The federal courts of appeals generally have been very conserva-
tive in using the writ of mandamus to obtain appellate jurisdiction
over interlocutory orders.'81  The writ is still largely confined to
"extraordinary" cases. Thus, from a statistical standpoint manda-
mus review has not had a dramatic impact on federal appellate
practice. Nevertheless, mandamus is an important means of circum-
venting the final judgment rule in those few "extraordinary" cases.
Because it is available only when other means of review do not
exist, 1 2 mandamus represents the "safety valve" of federal appeal-
ability, the "last resort" remedy by which the appellate courts can
exempt an interlocutory order from the final judgment rule.
The petition for mandamus is particularly appropriate for chal-
lenging the discretionary decisions of district courts.18 3 However, the
writ will not issue to control the discretion of the inferior courts, but
only to remedy a clear abuse of that discretion. 184  For example,
mandamus is appropriate to correct an abuse of discretion by a
district court that grants or denies a change of venue without properly
considering the relative convenience of the transfer to the parties and
witnesses.8 5 Moreover, when a district court remands an action to
state court for discretionary reasons not authorized by statute, manda-
mus is appropriate to vacate the remand order.8 6
The Supreme Court has rarely passed judgment on the use of
mandamus to review interlocutory orders. In the few cases in which
mandamus review has been approved by the Court, the writ was
used to further some other goal beyond just the resolution of issues
raised in the immediate appeal. In La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.,
18 7
181. C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 516.
182. See note 75 supra.
183. See section II.B supra.
184. See cases cited in note 136 supra and accompanying text,
185. Eg., Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 350 U.S. 822 (1955). See text accompanying note 138 supra.
186. Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976). See text accompany-
ing notes 149-54 supra.
187. 226 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1955), aff'd, 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
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for instance, mandamus provided an opportunity for the court of ap-
peals to admonish the district courts of that circuit for their excessive
practice of referring cases to masters. The Supreme Court agreed
that the references were an "abdication of the judicial function" and
held that the immediate review of the reference orders was consonant
with the appellate court's authority to exercise "supervisory con-
trol" of the district courts."'8 This supervisory power of the courts
of appeals also justified the use of mandamus in Thermtron Products,
Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,8 9 in which the Court held the writ to be ap-
propriate to check a district court's apparently frequent practice of
remanding actions properly removed to federal court. The Supreme
Court also found that a broad goal of the federal court system was
served by mandamus review in Schlagenhauf v. Holder.!9" The ap-
pellate court in Schlagenhauf availed itself of the opportunity to
resolve a question of first impression involving construction of one of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Supreme Court has not, however, intended that mandamus
become a carte blanche for the review of interlocutory orders as a
matter of course. Even in the La Buy decision, often regarded as
precedent for broad supervisory mandamus, the Court cautioned:
"This is not to say that the conclusion we reach on the facts of this
case is intended, or can be used, to authorize the indiscriminate use of
prerogative writs as a means of reviewing interlocutory orders: ' 191
The Court's opinions in Will v. United States1 92 and Kerr v. United
States District Court,1 93 filled with references to the "extraordinary"
nature of mandamus and to the requisite elements of "abuse of dis-
cretion" or "usurpation of power," also indicate concern by the Court
about an immoderate use of mandamus review. The Court indicated
in Kerr that mandamus is to be used sparingly so that the federal
policy against piecemeal litigation is not disturbed.194
The decisions of the Supreme Court in this area are not easily
reconciled. The Court at times has approved the liberal use of man-
damus review to supervise and advise the district courts as well as to
resolve "first impression" issues. But the Court on other occasions
has stressed moderation in the use of mandamus and has limited man-
damus review to cases in which the record supports a finding of
"abuse of discretion" or "usurpation of power."
1 95
188. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256, 259 (1957).
189. 423 U.S. 336 (1976).
190. 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
191. 352 U.S. at 255.
192. 389 U.S. 90 (1967).
193. 426 U.S. 394 (1976).
194. 426 U.S. at 402-03.
195. Wil v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967).
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Thus, to some extent, the federal courts of appeals retain wide
discretion to determine whether this "extraordinary" remedy is ap-
propriate in each particular case. The decision to permit mandamus
review of an interlocutory order must be made with one eye toward
the overall benefits to judicial administration gained by review and
the other toward the final judgment rule.
Charles Robert Janes
